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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of
the Case:

Three Jane Doe plaintiffs allege that online predators
contacted them on Facebook or Instagram and lured them into
sex trafficking through communications sent via messaging
functions on those platforms. MR1–44; MR444–516; MR847–
93. Plaintiffs assert identical state-law claims for negligence,
gross negligence, negligent undertaking, products liability,
and violations of section 98.002 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. MR32–36; MR499–503; MR882–87.
Facebook moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 91a
based on section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. § 230 (Pet. App. E), which (1) grants interactive
computer service providers—like Facebook—immunity from
suits seeking to hold them liable for third-party content, and
(2) expressly preempts state-law actions that seek to impose
such liability. Facebook cited hundreds of cases holding that
section 230 bars claims like those brought by plaintiffs.

Trial Court: Hon. Steven Kirkland, 334th District Court, Harris County
(Cause Nos. 2018-69816 & 2018-82214).
Hon. Mike Engelhart, 151st District Court, Harris County
(Cause No. 2019-16262).
Course of
Judge Kirkland denied Facebook’s motions to dismiss. Pet.
Proceedings: App. A–B. So did Judge Engelhart, except for the productsliability claim, which he dismissed because Facebook and
Instagram are not products. Pet. App. C; MR1365.
Facebook sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals on
October 25, 2019, and November 1, 2019. The Fourteenth
Court denied relief in a four-paragraph, per curiam
memorandum opinion joined by Justices Spain and
Poissant; Justice Christopher dissented and would have
granted the writ. In re Facebook, Inc., 2020 WL 2037193
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020) (Pet. App. D).
On July 3, 2020, this Court stayed all proceedings in the trial
courts pending resolution of Facebook’s mandamus petition.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Texas Government Code
§ 22.002(a). This petition previously was presented to the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals at Houston, which denied relief. See Tex. R. App. P.
52.3(e).

These cases present a question of law that is vital to the

jurisprudence of the state:
• Whether Texas will split from hundreds of courts
nationwide—including twelve federal courts of appeals and
at least four state courts of last resort—by allowing
plaintiffs to use artful pleading to thwart the immunity
from state-law civil claims provided by the plain text of
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
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ISSUE PRESENTED
Federal law extends “broad immunity” to interactive computer
service providers like Facebook “for all claims stemming from their
publication of information created by third parties.” Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (Clement, J.) (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3)). The issue presented is:
• Did the trial courts clearly abuse their discretion—and
leave Facebook with no adequate remedy at law—by
denying Facebook’s motions to dismiss, where section 230
affords Facebook immunity from suit that will be
irretrievably lost by delaying review until after trial?
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INTRODUCTION
Early on, Congress recognized that the Internet would create
virtually limitless opportunities for communication, education, and
commerce.

Interactive computer service providers were essential to

unleashing the power of the Internet, so Congress protected them by
granting immunity from suit—not just a defense to liability—against
claims related to content created by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Congress penned that immunity in broad terms and then, for good
measure, preempted all state and local claims inconsistent with that
immunity.
Almost twenty-five years have passed since Congress enacted
section 230. During that time, courts have issued hundreds of decisions
effectuating Congress’s intent by adhering to the plain text of the statute
and dismissing artfully pled state-law civil claims. For unless courts give
effect to the immunity from suit provided by section 230 at the earliest
stage of litigation, that immunity will be irretrievably lost.
Absent mandamus relief, that is exactly what will happen here—a
result that would contradict the plain text of the statute, ignore the
overwhelming weight of precedent construing that text, and subvert
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Congress’s purposes in enacting it. Section 230 required the trial courts
below to dismiss plaintiffs’ suits because each suit necessarily depends
on content allegedly communicated and posted by third parties through
Facebook’s platforms. But the trial courts refused to do so, and the court
of appeals failed to correct their error. Justice Christopher dissented,
“urg[ing] [this] Court to review these cases” because “Facebook has
federal statutory immunity from these suits.” In re Facebook, Nos. 1419-00845-cv, 14-19-00847-cv, 14-19-00886-cv, 2020 WL 2037193, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020) (Christopher, J.,
dissenting) (Pet. App. D).
Hundreds of courts throughout Texas and across the nation—
including the Fifth Circuit—have followed the plain text and dismissed
on the pleadings materially indistinguishable suits based on section 230
immunity. This Court should grant the petition and restore uniformity
to Texas law on this exceedingly important, nationwide issue of statutory
construction and statutory immunity.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Statutory background
In 1996, Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications

Decency Act, which grants immunity to interactive computer service
providers against state-law claims that would impose liability based on
third-party content posted on or communicated through the providers’
services. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (“It is the policy of the United
States—(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; [and]
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”).1
Section 230 implements Congress’s legislative policy judgments in
two ways. First, it immunizes interactive computer service providers
from claims seeking to hold them liable for content generated or
communicated by third parties:
1

See also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In
enacting [section 230], Congress found that the Internet and related computer
services ‘represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources’ and ‘offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.’ ”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)).
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
Second, to enforce this broad immunity, section 230 bars all suits
that seek to hold providers liable for third-party content:
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
Congress took this step because, in its judgment, “[i]t would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings
for possible problems,” and “[f]aced with potential liability for each message
republished by their services, interactive computer service providers
might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages
posted.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
Congress also wanted to encourage service providers to take steps
to control or prevent harmful content on their platforms without fear of
liability if those efforts proved imperfect. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528
F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (Congress sought to “remove disincentives
for

the

development

and

utilization
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of

blocking

and

filtering

technologies”); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (Congress was concerned that “the
specter of liability” would “deter service providers from blocking and
screening offensive material”).
Through section 230, “Congress provided broad immunity” to
interactive computer service providers, and courts across the country
have construed section 230 accordingly.

MySpace, 528 F.3d at 418.

Courts have held that section 230 applies broadly to search engines like
Google and Yahoo!;2 social networking sites like Facebook, Instagram,
MySpace, and Twitter;3 and email and private messaging services offered
by those sites and others.4
In 2018, Congress enacted the Allow States and Victims to Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132
Stat. 1253 (2018).

FOSTA expressly exempts three specific types of

lawsuits from section 230 immunity:
2

See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268
(D.C. Cir. 2019); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101‒03 (9th Cir. 2009).
3

See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68 (2d Cir. 2019); Franklin v. X
Gear 101, LLC, 2018 WL 4103492, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018) (Instagram);
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 422; Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 627 n.7 (6th Cir. 2019).
4

See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1127–29 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(direct messaging), aff’d on other grounds, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018); Mitan v. A.
Neumann & Assocs., LLC, 2010 WL 4782771, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2010) (email);
accord Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528, 536–37 (D. Md.
2006) (private messaging).
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(1) federal civil actions brought by sex-trafficking victims
under 18 U.S.C § 1595 where the underlying conduct
violates 18 U.S.C. § 1591;
(2) state criminal prosecutions for sex trafficking where the
underlying conduct violates 18 U.S.C. § 1591 or 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421A; and
(3) parens patriae enforcement actions by state attorneys
general under 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
See FOSTA § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
Congress considered—but rejected—also exempting state-law civil
suits like those brought by plaintiffs here. Congress rejected such an
exemption because it wanted to combat online sex trafficking through a
“uniform national policy” rather than a “patchwork of 50 different laws.”
Online Sex Trafficking and the Communications Decency Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Serial No. 115-43,
115th Cong. 7, 9 (2017) (testimony of former Congressman and section 230
co-author Chris Cox and U.S. Naval Academy Professor Jeff Kosseff); see
H.R. 1865 § 3(a)(2)(C), 115th Cong. (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017).
II.

Factual background
In Cause No. 2018-69816, Jane Doe alleges that in 2012, when she

was 15, an adult stranger sent her a “friend” request on Facebook and
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thereafter exchanged messages with her on Facebook’s messaging
service. MR27–28.5 He made false promises of financial security and a
better life through modeling, and then invited her to meet him offline.
MR28. He then raped and beat her, and ultimately forced her into sex
trafficking. MR29.
In Cause No. 2018-82214, Jane Doe alleges that in 2017, when she
was 14, a stranger became her “Instagram friend” (Instagram is owned
by Facebook) and then used Instagram’s messaging service to make false
promises of love and a better future to lure her into an offline meeting.
MR474. Thereafter, assailants forced her into sex trafficking, posted her
for sale online using partially nude photographs of her, and sexually
exploited her. MR475, 498. After she was rescued from trafficking, her
traffickers continued using her Instagram profile to traffic others.
MR475.
In Cause No. 2019-16262, Jane Doe alleges that in 2016, when she
was 14, a stranger “friended” her on Instagram and exchanged messages
with her via Instagram’s messaging service. MR877–78. He convinced

5

The facts that follow are plaintiffs’ allegations, which are “taken as true” for
purposes of Facebook’s Rule 91a motions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.
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her to meet him in person and then raped, abused, and trafficked her.
MR878–79.
The petitions acknowledge that Facebook takes a variety of
measures to block content related to explicit material, sexual exploitation,
and human trafficking;6 blocks users who post sexually explicit content;7
reports instances of abuse to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children;8 responds to subpoenas from law enforcement;9
prohibits abusive content, including content that exploits minors;10 and
takes a number of other precautions to protect minors.11

Plaintiffs

nonetheless allege that Facebook should have done more to detect,
monitor, flag, and block potentially harmful third-party content and
communications—by providing additional warnings, “flagging buzzwords
...

that

indicate

human

trafficking

and

blocking

all

further

communications,” adding more robust parental controls, “prevent[ing]

6

MR4–5, 12; MR450, 457; MR853–54, 861.

7

MR5; MR450; MR854.

8

MR4; MR449; MR853.

9

MR4, 12; MR450, 457; MR853, 861.

10

MR14–15; MR459–61; MR863–64.

11

MR9; MR455; MR858–59.
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adults over the age of 18 from communicating with minors,” verifying
user identity, “depriv[ing] known criminals from having accounts on
Facebook,” and taking other similar measures.

MR22–24, 32–35;

MR469–71, 499–500; MR872–73, 883–85.
Plaintiffs assert five state-law causes of action against Facebook:
(1) negligently failing to warn of or prevent online sex
trafficking;
(2) gross negligence for the same conduct;
(3) intentionally or knowingly benefiting from participation
in a sex-trafficking venture under Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 98.002;
(4) negligently undertaking to provide warnings
employing inadequate screening features; and

and

(5) strict products liability for providing defective warnings.
MR32–36; MR499–503; MR882–87.
Facebook moved to dismiss each petition under Rule 91a, relying
on section 230 immunity. The motions were denied by both trial courts.
Pet. App. A–C.12
12

Although plaintiffs amended their petitions after Facebook filed its motions to
dismiss, Facebook cites plaintiffs’ live petitions because none of those amendments
affects Facebook’s requested relief—dismissal of the claims against Facebook as
barred by section 230. While Facebook’s Rule 91a motions were pending in the 334th
Court, plaintiffs in Cause Nos. 2018-69816 and 2018-82214 filed amended petitions
adding negligence, negligent undertaking, and strict-liability failure-to-warn claims.
Compare MR94–98, and MR499–503, with MR159–62, and MR567–68. These claims
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Facebook sought mandamus relief and, on April 28, 2020, a
Fourteenth Court panel majority issued a four-paragraph, per curiam
memorandum opinion denying relief, stating only that “Facebook has not
established that it is entitled to mandamus relief.” 2020 WL 2037193, at
*1 (Spain and Poissant, JJ.).
Justice Christopher dissented, explaining that “these suits have no
basis in law, and dismissal under Texas Rule of Procedure 91a is proper,”
because section 230 “grants Facebook immunity from suits such as
these.” Id. (Christopher, J., dissenting). Justice Christopher “urge[d] the
Texas Supreme Court to review these cases.” Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Section 230 requires dismissal of lawsuits like plaintiffs’ that

seek to impose liability on interactive computer services for harmful
content posted or communicated on their platforms by third parties. The
Fifth Circuit, hundreds of other courts nationwide, and virtually every
court in Texas all agree: Artful pleading cannot defeat section 230’s plain
language. See MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416–20.
were addressed by the court in its order denying Facebook’s motion. MR391, 794. In
early 2020 (after mandamus briefing closed in the Fourteenth Court), plaintiffs
dismissed their claims against other defendants—by non-suit in Cause No. 2018-82214,
and by amendment in Cause Nos. 2018-69816 and 2019-16262. MR1–44; MR847–93.
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II.
point:

The 2018 FOSTA amendments to section 230 prove Facebook’s
By expressly exempting from section 230’s broad reach only

federal civil suits (brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1595) and state criminal
prosecutions, the plain language of FOSTA confirms that state civil suits
like plaintiffs’ remain barred. Plaintiffs’ faux textualism—cherry-picking
a section heading and a snippet of FOSTA’s savings clause—doesn’t
compel a different result. Nor does their heavy (and misguided) reliance
on legislative history. The plain text is clear, and the legislative history
only confirms that plaintiffs’ claims are barred: Congress considered—
and rejected—language that would have exempted all state civil suits by
sex-trafficking victims. Compare H.R. 1865 § 3(a)(2)(C), 115th Cong. (as
introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017), with FOSTA § 4, codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(5) (exempting only certain federal civil and state criminal suits).
III. Mandamus is needed to correct the trial courts’ clear abuse of
discretion in misapplying the law and failing to dismiss these cases as
section 230 requires. See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018)
(courts lack discretion to disregard the law). Absent mandamus, the legal
error below will effectively destroy Facebook’s statutory immunity from
suit and leave it without an adequate appellate remedy. See In re Geomet
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Recycling LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91–92 (Tex. 2019).
The whole point of immunity from suit is to protect against the
chilling effect imposed by the time, cost, and other demands of litigation.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254–
55 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “aim to resolve the question of [section] 230
immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity
protects websites not only from ‘ultimate liability,’ but also from ‘having
to fight costly and protracted legal battles’ ”—“immunity from suit . . . is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”) (quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). That is why this Court
grants mandamus relief when immunity precludes a plaintiff’s suit. See,
e.g., In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014); In re Schmitz,
285 S.W.3d 451, 459 (Tex. 2009).
***
This Court should grant Facebook’s petition and direct the trial
courts to dismiss these cases under section 230—not only to preserve
Facebook’s statutory immunity, but also to restore uniformity to Texas
law on a recurring, important question of statutory construction that
impacts the ability of the Internet to continue functioning as we know it.
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MANDAMUS STANDARD
“[M]andamus is proper when the trial court has abused its
discretion by committing a clear error of law for which appeal is an
inadequate remedy.” In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 297–98 (Tex.
2006). A “trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or
applying the law to the facts”—such as when it construes a statute’s plain
text. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004).
Appeal is an inadequate remedy where requiring the defendant to
stand trial and delay review until after final judgment would effectively
defeat immunity from suit. K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 592–93 (Tex.
1994) (conditionally granting writ to correct erroneous denial of sovereign
immunity and “reaffirm[ing] that an appeal does not provide an adequate
remedy in this context”); In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2001)
(conditionally granting writ to correct erroneous denial of legislative
immunity); Marshall v. Wilson, 616 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1981) (same
where statute immunized defendant from collateral litigation). As the
U.S. Supreme Court has explained, immunity from suit “is effectively lost
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Section 230’s plain language immunizes Facebook from
plaintiffs’ suits—as over two decades of precedent confirms.
The plain text of section 230, the legislative policies it furthers, and

the overwhelming weight of authority compel the conclusion that
Facebook is immune from plaintiffs’ state-law civil claims. Plaintiffs
contend that they seek to hold Facebook liable not as a publisher of thirdparty content, but rather for not taking sufficient steps (1) to prevent
harmful third-party content from being communicated on its platforms
or (2) to warn plaintiffs about the risks such content may present. But
this is precisely the type of artful pleading that the Fifth Circuit and
myriad

other

courts

have

squarely

rejected

as

fundamentally

inconsistent with section 230’s plain language.
The trial courts clearly abused their discretion by refusing to
dismiss these lawsuits.
A.

Section 230’s plain text grants Facebook immunity
from suit.

Section 230’s plain text makes clear that interactive computer
service providers (such as Facebook) have statutory immunity not just
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from liability, but from civil suits brought under state law. As Judge
Sutton explained in O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc.:
“No cause of action may be brought,” [section 230] says, “and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law,” for
any claim that purports to treat an “interactive computer
service” “as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided” by someone else.
831 F.3d 352, 354–55 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (e)(3)).
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Facebook are barred by this
provision.

There is no dispute that Facebook is a “provider” of “an

interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); see also Klayman v.
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Facebook qualifies as
an interactive computer service because it is a service that provides
information to ‘multiple users’ by giving them ‘computer access . . . to a
computer server.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)).
And plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable for “information
provided by another information content provider”—i.e., the messages
written and sent by the online predators. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3)
(“information content provider” means “any person” “responsible” “for
the creation” of “information provided through” an “interactive computer
service”).
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That unambiguous statutory text explains why every U.S. Court of
Appeals to have construed section 230 has granted or affirmed dismissal
of claims seeking to hold providers liable for third-party content.13
Plaintiffs ignore—and ask this Court to disregard—not only those
decisions but also more than twenty decisions by state and federal courts
throughout Texas, including three decisions by Texas appellate courts
and one by the Fifth Circuit.14 Each of these decisions refused to allow a

13

See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir.
2007); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019); Green v. Am. Online
(AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 2003); Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 252–53 (4th Cir.);
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 415 (5th Cir.); O’Kroley, 831 F.3d at 354 (6th Cir.); Chi. Lawyers’
Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir.
2008); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc.,
836 F.3d 1263, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2016); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online
Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000); Dowbenko v. Google, Inc., 582 F. App’x 801,
803 (11th Cir. 2014); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1355 (D.C. Cir.).
14

MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420; see Davis v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., 2015 WL 1535694,
at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015, pet. denied) (affirming Rule 91a dismissal
based on section 230); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 760–61 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied); Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 215–18 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.); see also McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 433 F. Supp.
3d 1034, 1044–45 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Takhvar v. Page, 2018 WL 4677808, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Feb. 25, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 4677799 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2018); Inge v.
Walker, 2017 WL 4838981, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017); La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 995 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Int’l Cotton Mktg., Inc. v. Commodity Credit
Corp., 2009 WL 10705346, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 629
F. Supp. 2d 663, 664–65 (E.D. Tex. 2009); GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC,
2009 WL 62173, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 27, 2006); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
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suit based on third-party content to proceed in the face of section 230’s
broad statutory immunity.15
These decisions faithfully apply the statutory text to dismiss statelaw suits that seek to hold interactive computer service providers liable
for harmful third-party content—even where the third-party content
leads to tragic consequences. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–24 (1st Cir. 2016) (sex trafficking of minors);
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416 (sexual assault of a minor); Doe II v. MySpace
Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 149–50 (Ct. App. 2009) (sexual assault of
minors); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019)
(harassment and stalking); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752,
753, 762 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (revenge pornography).
Mandamus is needed to correct the trial courts’ failure to dismiss
the claims here, too.
B.

Artful pleading cannot defeat the plain language of
section 230.

A suit seeking to hold Facebook liable for publishing and
transmitting messages generated by third parties is precisely the type of

15

The only Texas decision allowing such a suit to proceed was subsequently
reversed on interlocutory review. See GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d 752.
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publishing activity section 230 was enacted to prohibit—and artful
pleading cannot overcome the statute’s plain language.

2020 WL

2037193, at *1 (Christopher, J., dissenting) (“artful pleading . . . should
not prevail over the statute”).
What matters is not magic words (or whether a plaintiff expressly
alleges that she seeks to hold the provider liable for publishing thirdparty content), but whether, at its core, a claim “seek[s] to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or
alter content.” Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330).
The Fifth Circuit’s MySpace decision is closely on point. In that case,
the plaintiffs (a mother and her minor daughter) alleged that the minor
daughter was sexually assaulted after an online predator contacted the
daughter on MySpace and lured her into meeting him offline. 528 F.3d at
416. Just like plaintiffs here, the MySpace plaintiffs alleged that MySpace
(the provider) “failed to implement basic safety measures to prevent
sexual predators from communicating with minors on its Web site.” Id.
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In an opinion authored by Judge Clement and joined by Judges
Elrod and Garwood, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case on
the pleadings, ruling that section 230 extends “broad immunity” “to Webbased service providers for all claims stemming from their publication of
information created by third parties.” Id. at 418. “Parties complaining that
they were harmed by a Web site’s publication of user-generated content
have recourse,” the court explained—“they may sue the third-party user
who generated the content, but not the interactive computer service that
enabled them to publish the content online.” Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit rejected the MySpace plaintiffs’ attempt to avoid
that result through artful pleading. Responding to plaintiffs’ “assertion
that they only seek to hold MySpace liable for its failure to implement
measures that would have prevented Julie Doe from communicating with
[the online predator],” the Fifth Circuit explained that plaintiffs’
“allegations [were] merely another way of claiming that MySpace was
liable for publishing the communications and they speak to MySpace’s
role as a publisher of online third-party-generated content.” Id. at 420.16

16

In reaching that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on one of the cases plaintiffs’
here rely on: Green v. America Online (AOL). See Resp. to Pet. 18–19; MySpace, 528
F.3d at 420 (“Green demonstrates the fallacy of [plaintiffs’] argument.”). Green held
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So too here. There is no allegation that Facebook’s involvement
extends beyond transmitting and publishing third-party communications
between users—activity squarely protected by section 230. Resp. to Pet.
4–5. Instead, as in Myspace, plaintiffs allege that Facebook should have
prevented the third-party online predators’ communications from
reaching plaintiffs, warned the plaintiffs of the dangers of those
communications, or both.

See Resp. to Pet. 1 (“Facebook failed to

implement proper safeguards and warnings”); Resp. to Pet. 6
(“[Facebook] could have implemented safeguards to prevent adults from
connecting with minors they did not know, . . . prevented unauthorized
adults from contacting minors, . . . or prevented known sex traffickers
from having Facebook accounts.”); Resp. to Pet. 8 (“[plaintiffs] seek to
hold Facebook liable for its conduct in failing to properly warn minor
users of the dangers of sex trafficking”).
But as the Fifth Circuit and several other courts have held, seeking
to hold a provider liable for failing to prevent third-party communications

that a plaintiff’s claim for negligent failure “to address certain harmful content on
[AOL’s] network” was barred by section 230 because, at base, that claim “attempts to
hold AOL liable for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of
content from its network—actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.”
Green, 318 F.3d at 471.
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is no different than holding it liable for transmitting and publishing those
communications. See MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420; Daniel v. Armslist, LLC,
926 N.W.2d 710, 723–24 (Wis. 2019) (“This rule prevents plaintiffs from
using ‘artful pleading’ to state their claims only in terms of the interactive
computer service provider’s own actions, when the underlying basis for
liability is unlawful third-party content published by the defendant.”).17
Plaintiffs’

failure-to-warn

claims

are

yet

another

way

of

accomplishing that same result. Whether a plaintiff claims a provider
should have refused to publish communications or should have effectively
erased those communications by warning other users to disregard them,
the plaintiff is treating the provider as a publisher—exactly what section
230 prohibits. Only a publisher, after all, could eliminate, edit, or warn
about content on its platform.

17

In Daniel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that section 230 barred a
plaintiff’s claim that Armslist—a classified site for selling firearms—negligently
“fail[ed] to implement sufficient safety measures to prevent the unlawful use of its
website.” 926 N.W.2d at 725–26 (discussing allegations that Armslist failed to
“provide proper legal guidance to users” or to “adequately screen unlawful content”).
The court ruled that the plaintiff’s claim was “precisely the type of claim that
is prohibited by [section] 230(c)(1), no matter how artfully pled” because the “duty
Armslist is alleged to have violated”—“fail[ing] to adequately monitor [third-party]
content”—“derives from its role as a publisher of firearm advertisements.” Id. at 726.
“That Armslist may have known that its site could facilitate illegal gun sales does not
change the result.” Id.
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Indeed, the Second Circuit reached precisely that conclusion in
affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims in
Herrick. Like plaintiffs here, Herrick alleged that the service provider
was liable for “failing to generate its own warning that its software could
be used to impersonate and harass others.” 765 F. App’x at 591. The court
affirmed the dismissal of Herrick’s failure-to-warn claim as “barred by
[section] 230” because that claim was “inextricably linked to [the service
provider’s] alleged failure to edit, monitor, or remove the offensive [thirdparty] content.” Id. There is no meaningful difference between alleging
that a provider failed to warn users about the dangers of third-party
content and alleging that a provider failed “to combat or remove offensive
third-party content”—both “are barred by [section] 230.” Id. at 590.
In sum, section 230 bars claims alleging that an interactive
computer service provider is liable for failing to do something about thirdparty content—regardless of what that something is (e.g., block it,
prevent it, edit it, remove it, or warn against its dangers). The purported
duty to do something, which underlies such claims, “derives from [the
provider’s] role as a publisher” and is precisely why such claims are
“prohibited by [section] 230(c)(1), no matter how artfully pled.” Daniel,
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926 N.W.2d at 726; see Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 792 (Cal. 2018)
(similarly rejecting “[p]laintiffs’ attempted end-run around section 230”).
C.

The “presumption against preemption” plays no role
given section 230’s express preemption provision.

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, section 230 “also contains a
preemption provision that expressly extends . . . immunity to ‘State or
local law’ claims ‘inconsistent with this section.’ ” Marshall’s Locksmith
Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)); see also Daniel, 926 N.W.2d at 717
(section 230 “preempts any state tort claims . . . that [are] inconsistent
with” “immunizing interactive computer service providers from liability
for publishing third-party content”).18
Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent section 230’s express preemption
provision by invoking the “presumption against preemption.” Resp. to
Pet. 9–10, 17–18. But where, as here, “the statute’s language is plain,”
the analysis “begins ‘with the language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is

18

See also Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y.
2011) (“Section 230 . . . preempts any state law—including imposition of tort
liability—inconsistent with its protections.”); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010,
1013, 1018 (Fla. 2001) (holding “section 230 does preempt Florida law” because
“section 230 expressly bars ‘any actions’ and we are compelled to give the language of
this preemptive law its plain meaning”).
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also where the inquiry should end.’ ” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. TaxFree Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).19 As the U.S. Supreme Court made
clear in Puerto Rico, if “the statute contains an express pre-emption
clause, [courts] do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but
instead focus on the plain wording of the clause”—because the plain
language “necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 230’s express preemption clause conveys its scope with
perhaps the most understandable word in the English language: “no
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphases added); see also BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v.
City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2016) (applying express
preemption because statute’s “language . . . unmistakably expresses the
Legislature’s desire to preempt any ordinance ‘inconsistent’ with the Act
or with a TCEQ rule or order”). The presumption against preemption has
no role to play here.

19

At no point do plaintiffs argue that the text of section 230(e)(3) is ambiguous.
Instead, putting the cart before the horse, plaintiffs contend that “the legislative
history . . . raise[s] significant questions” about what “Congress intended.” Resp. to
Pet. 18.
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Applying the presumption wouldn’t change the outcome in any
event.

Overcoming the presumption requires only a clear intent to

preempt. See MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 489
(Tex. 2010) (“we apply the presumption that Congress did not intend to
preempt contrary state law absent evidence that such a result was
Congress’s clear and manifest purpose”); City of Laredo v. Laredo
Merchants Ass’n, 550 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Tex. 2018) (finding a clear
“legislative intent . . . to preempt” based on the plain language of the
statute, which contained an express preemption provision). Here, section
230(e)(3) unquestionably evinces such a clear intent as to both the
existence of federal preemption and the scope of that preemption. See
Marshall’s Locksmith, 925 F.3d at 1267 n.2; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333–34.
***
The statute’s plain text, two decades of precedent construing it, and
the legislative purposes it furthers all compel the conclusion that
plaintiffs’ state-law claims are barred by section 230. Neither plaintiffs’
artful pleading nor the trial courts’ clear abuse of discretion should be
permitted to defeat the statutory text. This Court should grant Facebook’s
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petition, direct the trial courts to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, and bring
Texas in line with every other jurisdiction to address section 230.
If, instead, plaintiffs are permitted to continue litigating their
cases, then Texas will become the Nation’s sole forum for claims seeking
to hold interactive computer service providers liable for third-partygenerated content in direct contravention of section 230’s plain language.
II.

FOSTA confirms that section 230 bars plaintiffs’ claims.
Faced with the plain text of section 230 and two decades of

precedent, plaintiffs are left to argue that FOSTA’s 2018 amendments to
section 230 exempted their state-law civil claims from section 230’s
otherwise broad grant of immunity. See Resp. to Pet. 14–18. But the
plain text of FOSTA makes clear that plaintiffs’ claims remain barred.
Neither plaintiffs’ faux textualist cherry-picking nor their resort to
legislative history compels a contrary conclusion.
A.

FOSTA’s plain text confirms that plaintiffs’ state-law
civil suits continue to be barred by section 230.

FOSTA expressly exempts three specific types of sex-traffickingrelated actions from section 230’s scope:
(1) federal civil actions brought by victims under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a) (if the underlying conducts violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591);
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(2) federal civil actions brought by state attorneys general
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d); and
(3) state criminal prosecutions (if the underlying conduct
violates 18 U.S.C. § 1591 or 18 U.S.C. § 2421A).
See FOSTA § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). None of those exemptions applies
here.
Congress carefully enumerated specific categories of exempt claims,
but did not include state-law civil suits like those here—a clear indication
that such claims are not exempted. See Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 424
(2014) (Scalia, J.) (Congress’s “meticulous . . . enumeration of exemptions
and exceptions . . . confirms that courts are not authorized to create
additional exceptions”). The FOSTA exemptions are limited by the plain
text to claims that these plaintiffs did not (or could not) bring. Nothing
in FOSTA altered section 230’s prohibition on the state-law civil claims
plaintiffs did choose to bring.
With the plain text of FOSTA against them, plaintiffs try to cobble
together support from a section heading and a snippet of FOSTA’s
savings clause—but neither can change the meaning of the plain text.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on section 230(e)(5)’s heading—“No effect on
sex trafficking law,” see Resp. to Pet. 1, 7, 13—but ignore that section’s
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text, which makes clear that the “sex trafficking law” to which the
heading refers is a federal sex-trafficking law (18 U.S.C. § 1595) and
certain state criminal laws:
(5)

No effect on sex trafficking law

Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A))
shall be construed to impair or limit—
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section
1595 of title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim
constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought
under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would
constitute a violation of section 1591 of title 18; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought
under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would
constitute a violation of section 2421A of title 18, and
promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the
jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation
of prostitution was targeted.
FOSTA § 4, 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(5) (Pet. App. E) (emphases added).20
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that titles and
headings cannot alter the meaning of a statute’s plain text. Fla. Dep’t of

20

Section 1595(a) provides that a victim of sex trafficking as defined by federal
law “may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which
that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this
chapter).” And section 1595(d) authorizes state attorneys general to bring parens
patriae actions against “any person who violates section 1591,” which proscribes sex
trafficking of children.
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Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (“a subchapter
heading cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute”); Pa. Dep’t
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“the title of a statute . . . cannot
limit the plain meaning of the text”).
Rather, section “headings . . . are ‘but a short-hand reference to the
general subject matter’ of [a] provision, ‘not meant to take the place of
the detailed provisions of the text.’ ” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429,
446 (2014) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519,
528 (1947)); see also Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S.
Ct. 1969, 1977–78 (2016) (prefatory language does “not change the plain
meaning of the operative clause”).21
Plaintiffs also point to the first half of FOSTA’s “savings clause,” see
Resp. to Pet. 16–17, but the rest of that clause refutes their argument:
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall
be construed to limit or preempt any civil action or criminal
prosecution under Federal law or State law (including State
statutory law and State common law) filed before or after the
day before the date of enactment of this Act that was not
21

At most, a heading can help resolve facial ambiguity in the operative text, see
Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. at 47, but there is no ambiguity here to resolve.
FOSTA explicitly exempts specific federal civil actions and state criminal actions from
the scope of section 230—it leaves state civil actions, like plaintiffs’ suits here, barred.
See FOSTA § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). FOSTA did not alter the language of either
section 230(c)(1) or section 230(e)(3)—the provisions that bar plaintiffs’ state-law civil
claims in the first place.
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limited or preempted by section 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230), as such section was in effect on the
day before the date of enactment of this Act.
FOSTA § 7, 132 Stat. at 1254 (plaintiffs’ omission emphasized). As its
full text makes clear, this clause merely provides that FOSTA doesn’t
expand section 230’s preemption to any civil suit or criminal prosecution
that was not barred by section 230 before FOSTA. But because state-law
civil claims like plaintiffs’ were barred by section 230 before FOSTA (and
remain barred today), FOSTA’s savings clause is irrelevant here. See
supra p. 17 (citing cases).22
B.

FOSTA’s legislative history only confirms what its
plain text says.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on legislative history. See Resp. to Pet. 9–10,
15–18.

But legislative history has no relevance where, as here, the

statutory text is clear. Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex.
2016) (“[Courts] do not resort to extrinsic aides, such as legislative history,
to interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous.”). And in any event,
the legislative history confirms Facebook’s interpretation. The original

22

See also M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d
1041, 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2011); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D.
Ill. 2009); cf. Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 367–68 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (discussing dismissal of sex-trafficking-related claims under section 230).
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version of the bill that became FOSTA included language—which
Congress considered and rejected—expressly exempting from section 230
all state-law civil suits brought by sex-trafficking victims:
(5) NO

EFFECT

ON

CIVIL

LAW

RELATING

TO

SEXUAL

EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OR SEX TRAFFICKING.—Nothing

in
this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement or
limit the application of—
(A) section 1595 of title 18, United States Code; or
(B) any other federal or state law that provides causes of
action, restitution, or other civil remedies to victims of—
(i) sexual exploitation of children;
(ii) sex trafficking of children; or
(iii) sex trafficking by force, threats of force, fraud, or
coercion.

H.R. 1865 § 3(a)(2)(C) (as originally introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017)
(emphases added).

Congress rejected that broad exemption, and

deliberately chose a narrower, more focused approach that favored
uniform national standards over a “patchwork” of state laws. See FOSTA
§ 4, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (exempting certain federal civil suits brought by
sex-trafficking victims, certain federal civil suits brought by state
attorneys general, and certain state criminal prosecutions); see also supra
p. 6 (citing H.R. Serial No. 115-43 at 7, 9).
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As this Court has explained, the “deletion of a provision in a
pending bill disclose[s] the legislative intent to reject the proposal.”
Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Smith
v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616–17 (Tex. 1980)); see Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where Congress includes limiting
language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment,
it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”); INS v.
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987) (“Few principles of
statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it
has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”).
In a similar vein, plaintiffs contend that their claims fit within
FOSTA’s exemptions because their “state law claims are the same sort of
claims Congress protected against preemption” by exempting claims
under the federal sex-trafficking laws in FOSTA. Resp. to Pet. 14–15.
But this argument lacks any basis in law and is contrary to section 230’s
plain text.
To begin, adopting plaintiffs’ argument would require improperly
disregarding Congress’s careful enumeration of specific categories of
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exempt claims in FOSTA. See Law, 571 U.S. at 424. In FOSTA itself,
Congress showed not only that it knows how to exempt state-law claims
that have the same elements as various federal statutes, but also that it
does so expressly. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(B)–(C) (exempting “criminal
prosecution[s] brought under State law”—if the underlying conduct
violates either 18 U.S.C. § 1591 or 18 U.S.C. § 2421A) (emphasis added).
Indeed, plaintiffs’ same-sort-of-claims argument would render that
express exemption superfluous because section 230(e)(1) (enacted in
1996) itself exempts enforcement of “any” “Federal criminal statute.”
Applying plaintiffs’ same-sort-of-claims logic, state prosecutions for
conduct that also violated federal criminal law never would have been
precluded by section 230 in the first place, which would in turn render
FOSTA’s express exemption of those prosecutions unnecessary and
redundant. That cannot be right, as it would violate the rule against
surplusage. See Shinogle v. Whitlock, 596 S.W.3d 772, 776–78 (Tex.
2020) (“To read the statute the way [plaintiffs] suggest would render the
word defendant meaningless or mere surplusage. This, we will not do.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting TIC Energy &
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Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016)); Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument relies on an unprecedented
interpretation of the phrase “consistent with this section” in
section 230(e)(3). See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (permitting enforcement of
“any State law that is consistent with this section” while preempting “any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section”) (emphases
added). According to plaintiffs, this means that a state-law claim can
proceed if it is consistent with the types of federal claims that are
exempted from section 230’s broad immunity by section 230(e). See Resp.
to Pet. 14–15.
But as the overwhelming weight of authority makes clear, the
relevant inquiry under section 230(e)(3) is whether a state-law claim
conflicts with section 230(c)(1) by seeking to hold a provider liable for
third-party content—not whether a state-law claim is consistent with the
claims Congress exempted from section 230’s scope (like the sextrafficking-related claims exempted by FOSTA). See O’Kroley, 831 F.3d
at 354–55 (“ ‘No cause of action may be brought,’ [section 230] says, ‘and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law,’ for any claim
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that purports to treat an ‘interactive computer service [provider]’ ‘as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided’ by someone else.”)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3)).23
And even though an exemption for federal criminal statutes has
been in section 230 since its inception, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), no court
has ever read section 230(e)(3) to exempt state laws that present the
“same sort of claims” as exempted federal criminal laws. Plaintiffs can
point to nothing in FOSTA that would cast doubt on this long line of
precedent, and indeed FOSTA did not alter the language of either
section 230(c)(1) or section 230(e)(3). See supra note 20.
Any lingering uncertainty is dispelled by Congress’s explicit
rejection of language that would have exempted all state civil suits by
sex-trafficking victims—arguably “the same sort of claims” that Congress
actually exempted in section 230(e)(5). Compare H.R. 1865 § 3(a)(2)(C)

23

See also Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1356 (section 230(e)(3) “adds preemptive bite to
[section 230(c)(1)’s] prohibition”); Marshall’s Locksmith, 925 F.3d at 1267 (“To
determine whether dismissal [under section 230(e)(3)] is appropriate, this circuit has
adopted a three-pronged test that tracks the text of [section] 230(c)(1).”); Bennett v.
Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“To give [section 230(c)’s]
provisions teeth, section 230[(e)(3)] provides that ‘[n]o cause of action may be brought
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.’ ”) (second alteration in original); Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1011 (section
230(e)(3) “preempts any state law—including imposition of tort liability—
inconsistent with [section 230(c)(1)’s] protections”).
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(Apr. 3, 2017), with FOSTA § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). At base, plaintiffs
ask this Court to do what Congress declined to do—expand FOSTA’s
exemptions beyond those delimited by its plain text.
***
Section 230’s plain language bars plaintiffs’ claims, and those
claims are not exempted by FOSTA. Plaintiffs are not without a remedy.
As the Fifth Circuit explained, a plaintiff allegedly “harmed by a Web
site’s publication of user-generated content . . . may sue the third-party
user who generated the content.” MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419; see also 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A) (authorizing certain federal civil actions by sextrafficking victims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595).
But section 230 immunity embodies a legislative policy judgment to
relieve interactive computer service providers of the burdens of litigation
altogether. E.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. The trial courts’ decisions to
the contrary cannot stand—particularly in the face of section 230’s plain
language and the mountain of precedent interpreting it.
III. Facebook has no adequate appellate remedy.
Absent mandamus relief, Facebook’s immunity from suit will be
permanently lost. A successful appeal after discovery and trial will come
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far too late. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 228 (Tex. 2004) (sovereign immunity case discussing the need for
the State to be able to “extricate itself from litigation”—in a “timely
manner”—“if it is truly immune”); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309,
317 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Scalia and Wald, JJ.) (forcing a defendant “to
proceed to trial . . . will generally constitute irreparable injury not
because of the expense of litigation, but because of the irretrievable loss
of immunity from suit”).
As this Court has explained, “[m]andamus review of significant
rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important
substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss . . . and spare
private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted
enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.”
Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
The whole point of section 230’s “[n]o cause of action may be
brought” language is to protect interactive computer service providers
like Facebook from suit. Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254–55. Forcing
Facebook to litigate plaintiffs’ claims is squarely contrary to Congress’s
purpose in providing broad immunity from suit—and at this stage can be
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avoided only through mandamus relief from this Court. See id. (“Section
230 immunity . . . is generally accorded effect at the first logical point in
the litigation process” because “immunity from suit . . . is effectively lost
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”).
As this Court and others have recognized, statutory immunity from
suit embodies a legislative policy judgment to relieve defendants of the
burdens of litigation altogether. See Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d
401, 415 (Tex. 1997) (discussing “political policy concerns” undergirding
legislative grant of immunity from suit); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330
(“Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom
of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. . . . Section 230
was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum.”). As the U.S. Supreme Court has stressed, the
refusal to enforce immunity from suit is “effectively unreviewable on
appeal from final judgment” because that immunity is “lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27.
Where, as here, trial courts refuse to enforce statutory immunity,
mandamus is not just an appropriate remedy—it is the only remedy. See

-38-

Perry, 60 S.W.3d at 859–62; Marshall, 616 S.W.2d at 934. Just as an egg
can’t be un-scrambled, and a bell can’t be un-rung, a case can’t be unlitigated, which is why the “most frequent use [this Court has] made of
mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to
trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right
involved.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008);
see also Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138–41 (conditionally granting writ to
enforce jury-trial waiver because the trial court’s failure to do so could
“[i]n no real sense . . . ever be rectified on appeal”).
Granting relief in such cases “spare[s] private parties and the
public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of
improperly conducted proceedings.” In re Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 569
S.W.3d 138, 142 (Tex. 2019); see also Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842
S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (“mandamus relief . . . will issue when the
failure to do so would vitiate and render illusory the subject matter of an
appeal”).
Facebook has been forced to litigate these cases for the past twenty
months, contrary to the plain text of section 230 and the overwhelming
weight of authority construing it.

Every day Facebook is forced to
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continue litigating statutorily barred suits is another day that it cannot
vindicate its congressionally mandated immunity from suit.
Federal law bars these lawsuits, and waiting for relief until after
the trials are conducted and final judgments are issued will deprive
Facebook of the very immunity that section 230 guarantees.
PRAYER
Facebook respectfully requests that this Court grant its petition
and direct the trial courts to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.
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